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Abstract. Th e following paper is based on a presentation given as the Juri Lotman 
Lecture at the University of Tartu conference “Creative Continuity: 50 years of Sign 
Systems Studies”, on December 5th, 2014.  Th e focus of the current analysis is to bring to 
light important new directions in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurolinguistics 
and how Lotman’s work contributes to deepening our understanding of the complex 
relationship of language(s) and brain(s) and the ever present dynamic cultural context.
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Lotman’s contributions to semiotic theory, anthroposemiotics, the study of artistic 
texts and defi ning the relationship between language and culture represent some of the 
most powerful works produced within the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics.  Key 
fundamental principles of Lotman’s theoretical work include a fully developed dynamic 
and interactive modelling of the semiosphere, the importance of acknowledging 
multiple (never singular) languages as minimums of semiotic meaning-generation, 
culture-text-level generation of collective memory, and the ever-present tension in 
communication acts.  Th ese principles are essential in deepening our understanding of 
the neurological interface of language, memory and culture.  Th is essay will explore the 
importance of Lotmanian paradigms in providing a basis for understanding variation 
at the neurological level for higher cognitive functions like language. 
By way of introduction, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to specifi c works 
by Lotman that are integral to research in the semiotics of culture, the cognitive sciences 
and cognitive neurolinguistic.  Th ese works include book-length publications like 
Culture and Explosion, Universe of the Mind, Semiosfera, Besedy o russkoj kul’ture, as 
well as numerous articles devoted to particular authors or cultural phenomena.  Perhaps 
the best way to focus attention is to provide a series of quotes that reveal the depth of 
Lotman’s contributions.
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One of Lotman’s most powerful articles is “Text in a text”, published in two redactions 
in 1992. Th is work provides a brilliant basis for articulating the dynamic process of the 
interaction of texts – not only literary texts, but the texts resulting from actual speech 
acts (by both monolingual and multilingual speakers/hearers) and how new meanings 
are generated in these interactions.  Below is but one example of the important dynamic 
of the interaction of texts: Lotman 1992a: 105, 110):
[...] любое пересечение систем резко увеличивает непредсказуемость 
дальнейшего движения. Случай, когда внешнее вторжение приводит к 
победе одной из столкнувшихся систем и подавлению другой, характеризует 
далеко не все события. Достаточно часто столкновение порождает нечто 
третье, принципиально новое, которое не является очевидным, логически 
предсказуемым последствием ни одной из столкнувшихся систем. 
Вторжение «обломка» текста на чужом языке может играть роль генератора 
новых смыслов. Это подчеркивается, например, возможностью введения 
говорений на «никаком» языке, которые, однако, оказываются чрезвычайно 
насыщенными смыслом. (Lotman 1992a: 105, 110)
[…] any intersection of systems can greatly increase the unpredictability of further 
development. Th e case where external intrusion allows one of the interacting 
systems to triumph over the other is not necessarily the characteristic outcome of 
such interactions. It is oft en the case that the collision gives rise to something else, 
something principally new, which is not obvious or a logical predicated outcome 
of either of the colliding systems.
Th e intrusion of a “fragment” of a text in another language can act as a generator 
of new meanings. Th is point is emphasised, for example, by the possibility of the 
introduction of discourses in a non-existent language, which, nevertheless, turns 
out to be extraordinarily saturated with meaning. (My translation, E. A.)
Lotman’s later work, Culture and Explosion, focuses on the important interaction of 
continuous and discontinuous cultural processes and how they combine to create 
dynamic and polysemic meanings at multiple levels.  Th is includes the interaction of 
diff erent perspectives, orientations in time and space, and translatability:
И постепенные, и взрывные процессы в синхронно работающей структуре 
выполняют важные функции: одни обеспечивают новаторство, другие – 
преемственность. […] Пересечение разных структурных организации 
становится источником динамики. […] Прошедшее дается в двух его 
проявлениях:  внутренне – непросредственная память текста, воплощенная 
в его внутренней структуре, ее неизбежной противоречивости, имма нент-
ной борьбе со своим внутренним синхронизмом, а внешне – как соотношение с 
внетекстовой памятью.  Мысленно поместив себя в то «настоящее время», 
которое реализовано в тексте [...], зритель как бы обращает свой взор в 
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прошлое, которое сходится как конус, упирающийся вершиной в настоящее 
время.  Обращаясь в будущее, аудитория погружается в пучок возможностей, 
еще не совершивших своего потенциального выбора. Не известность будущего 
позволяет приписывать значимость всему. (Lotman 1992a: 26–27)
[...] чем труднее и неадекватнее перевод одной непересекающейся части 
пространства на язык другой, тем более ценным в информационном и 
социальном отношениях становится факт этого парадоксального общения. 
Можно сказать, что перевод непереводимого оказывается носителем инфор-
мации высокой ценности. (Lotman 1992a: 15)
Both gradual and explosive processes in a synchronized working structure fulfi ll 
important functions:  some guarantee novelty, others succession.  Th e intersection of 
diff erent structural organizations becomes the source of the dynamic […]. Th e past 
is given in two manifestations: internal – the direct memory of the text as embodied 
by its internal structure, its unavoidable contradictions, its immanent battle with its 
own internal synchronism, and external – as it correlates with extra-textual memory. 
Placing oneself into the present, which is realized in the text…, the viewer actually 
fi xes his gaze into the past, which converges like a cone with its end-point in the 
present.  Looking into the future, the participant becomes inundated by a spectrum 
of possibilities that have not yet made their potential choice.  Th e unknown nature 
of the future allows anything to be potentially meaningful… (translated in Andrews 
2003: 38, 39)
[…] Th e more diffi  cult the translation of one non-intersecting space into 
another language, the higher the value of this paradoxical interaction in terms 
of its informative and social nature.  One might say that the translation of the 
untranslatable turns out to be the vehicle for highly valuable information […]. 
(translated in Andrews 2003: 49).
Th e ideological fundamentals of Culture and Explosion imply Lotman’s concept of 
the semiosphere, originally introduced in 1984.  Th e semiosphere is the prerequisite 
space that guarantees the potential for semiosis, which is in essence the generation of 
meanings.  In Lotman’s own words, the semiosphere is “the semiotic space necessary 
for the existence and functioning of languages, not the sum total of diff erent languages; 
in a sense the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction with 
languages” (Lotman 1990: 123), “a generator of information” (Lotman 1990: 127). 
Semiospheric space is the precursor to and the result of cultural development (Lotman 
1990: 125).  Lotman outlines the fundamental organizing principles of the semiosphere 
in Universe of the Mind to be heterogeneity of the space, asymmetry of internal structures, 
binariness of internal and external spaces, boundaries defi ned as bilingual fi lters that 
allow for the exchange of semiotic processes, and the “development of a metalanguage” 
as the fi nal act of the system’s structural organization (Lotman 1992a: 124–140). Of 
350 Edna Andrews
these fi ve points, only one is discussed in Culture and Explosion – in fact, the term 
semiosphere only appears in Culture and Explosion on two occasions.  Specifi cally, in the 
chapter entitled “Th e logic of explosion” Lotman focuses on the notion of heterogeneity 
as a characteristic of not only spatial diff erentiation, but even diff erent rates of change 
between and within individual subspaces of the semiosphere (Lotman 1992a: 177):
Семиологическое пространство заполнено свободно передвигающимися 
обломками различных структур, которые, однако, устойчиво хранят 
в себе память о целом и, попадая в чужие пространства, могут вдруг 
бурно реставрироваться. […] Полностью стабильных, не изменяющихся 
семиотических структур, видимо, не существует вообще.
Semiological space is fi lled with the freely moving fragments of a variety of 
structures which, however, store stably within themselves a memory of the whole 
which, falling into a strange environment, can suddenly and vigorously restore 
themselves. […] Completely stable invariant semiotic structures apparently do not 
exist at all. (Lotman 2009: 114)
Lotman’s reiteration of the importance of a complex dynamic within and around the 
semiosphere speaks to its critical role in capturing the essence of its explanatory power 
as a modelling system.  Th e fundamental tenet of Lotman’s approach to semiotics is 
the importance of semiotics as a dynamic process of semiosis, which is a system-level 
phenomenon engaging multiple sign complexes that are given simultaneously across 
spatio-temporal boundaries. As Lotman’s work is contextualized into the broader fi elds 
of structuralist and non-structuralist semiotic paradigms (e.g. comparisons with the 
works of Saussure, Hjelmslev, Peirce, Jakobson and others) and more recently the 
cognitive sciences, it is crucial to understand Lotman’s decision to target his theoretical 
models at the system level, and not at the individual sign level.  Th is fact may explain, 
for example, why Lotman does not devote more works to explications of sign types 
using iconicity, indexicality and symbolic distinctions.
Lotman’s work has oft en been read through the prism of other semiotic contributors 
of the 20th century, resulting in what oft en appears to be an attempt to position Lotman 
as more of a borrower of ideas than an innovator of ideas.  While it is certainly true that 
Lotman was deeply infl uenced by his own professors and some of the most outstanding 
intellectuals of his day, Lotman’s work is unique in its achievement of a broadly-based 
metalanguage for the modelling of cultures, a system of systems.  (Lotman’s interest in 
modelling systems involves two major trajectories: (1) the creation of metasemiotics, 
which focuses more on modelling the text than the text itself, and (2) the specifi c 
semiotic functioning of actual texts (1992a: 129).  It is the second trajectory that 
gives rise to a developed discipline of cultural semiotics.)  Lotman’s formulation and 
explication of semiospheric space is the single most powerful contributing factor to his 
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success in presenting a usable metalanguage for cultural analysis.  Vyacheslav Ivanov, 
Lotman’s colleague and co-founder of the Tartu-Moscow School, is very emphatic in 
his refocusing of the semiotic agenda so that it is contextualized within the defi ning 
principles and mechanisms of the semiosphere itself (Ivanov 1998: 792).
Lotman’s requirement of multiple languages as “the minimal meaning-generating 
unit” may be interpreted in a variety of ways and on a variety of levels (Lotman 1992a: 
16).  For instance, these diff erent languages could be the languages of the internal 
spaces of the semiosphere and the surrounding spaces in which the semiosphere is 
situated or could include Lotman’s fundamental distinction between I-I (also called 
autocommunication) and I-s/he models of communication as presented in Universe 
of the Mind (Lotman 1990: 21–33).  Th e primary function of autocommunication 
is to create new information at both the cultural and individual levels.  Th is new 
information displays an important series of characteristics, including (1) its qualitative 
reconstruction; (2) its not being self-contained or redundant; and (3) the doubling and 
redefi nition of both the message and the code (Lotman 1990: 21–22).  I will return to 
this question when contrasting Lotman with Vygotsky’s work below.
An interesting corollary of Lotman’s requirement of a minimum of two languages is 
that all phenomena must be translated in order to be perceived in semiospheric space. 
Such a formulation brings Lotman close to the non-structuralist semiotic theory of 
C. S. Peirce.  Furthermore, all translations necessarily change meaning, and the act of 
non-comprehension is as salient as the act of comprehension.  
Th e relationship between translatability and nontranslatability in Lotmanian theory 
is an important source of tension, which is a basic structural principle of all semiotic 
space that plays an integral part in the realization of discontinuities in the dynamic form 
of explosions.   In the introductory chapter of Culture and Explosion, Lotman describes 
the interrelationship of the multiple languages that lie at the heart of semiotic space and 
their mutual untranslatability (or limited translatability) as the “source of adjustment 
of the extra-lingual object to its refl ection in the world of languages” (Lotman 1992a: 
10).  Lotman expands this description in his defi nition of semiotic space:
Семиотическое пространство предстает перед нами как многослойное 
пересечение различных текстов, вместе складывающихся в определенный 
пласт, со сложными внутренними соотношениями, разной степенью 
переводимости и пространствами непереводимости. (Lotman 1992a: 42)
Semiotic space appears before us as the multi-layered intersection of various texts, 
which are woven together in a specifi c layer characterized by complex internal 
relationships and variable degrees of translatability and spaces of untranslatability. 
(Lotman 2009: 23)
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In concluding this section, I would like to mention Lotman’s contribution to 
understanding the function of collective memory:
[...] культура представляет собой коллективный интеллект и коллек-
тивную память, т.е. надындивидуальный механизм хранения и  передачи 
некоторых сообщений (текстов) и выработки новых [...]. Память куль-
туры не только едина, но и внутренне разнообразна.  Это означает, что ее 
единство существует лишь на некотором уровне и подразумевает нали чие 
частных «диалектов памяти», соответствующих внутренней органи за ции 
коллективов, составляющих мир данной культуры. (Lotman 1992b: 200)
[…] culture is both collective intellect and collective memory, i.e. a supra-
individual mechanism of preservation and the conveyance of specifi c texts and 
the generation of new ones […]. Cultural memory is not only unifi ed, but also has 
internal heterogeneity. Th is means that its unity exists only at a specifi c level, and 
presupposes the existence of discrete dialects of memory that correspond to the 
internal organization of collectives that constitute the world of a particular culture 
[…]. (My translation, E. A.)
Collective memory is a mechanism for self-preservation and cultural propagation. 
Lotman’s perspective on the importance of oral and written culture texts as the basis 
for collective memory is central to explaining the role of language in this process.  In 
shift ing the burden of memory from the individual to an externalized symbolic system 
collectively maintained through the process of writing, we are able to more clearly see 
how oral texts place a greater load on the individual’s memory system (Lotman 1990: 
246–247).  Th us, language becomes the symbolic condenser of the diff erent levels of 
semiosis and diff erent temporal segments (Lotman 1990: 110).  Lotman combines the 
forces of collective memory and collective intellect to contruct a model of culture in which 
knowledge is maintained and transferred through time, and the actualization of codifi ed 
and innovative information are guaranteed (Lotman 1992b: 200; Andrews 2003: 157).
Continuity and discontinuity in dynamic change
Lotman is one of several semiotic theoreticians who have made signifi cant contributions 
to the understanding and application of continuous and discontinuous phenomena. 
His work is closer to a Th omian model (cf. Th om’s work on morphogenesis) than to 
a Peircean one, and focuses on the primacy of discontinuity as the beginning of all 
perception (Lotman 1992a: 17–25; Th om 1975: 7; Peirce 1957: 59, 204). However, while 
Lotman begins with discontinuity, he points out how these “small portions of irritations” 
are reinterpreted by the organism as continuous and gradual, and also describes the 
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importance of both discontinuity and continuity as sources for cultural dynamics and 
evolution (Lotman 1992a: 17, 26–7). Furthermore, Lotman points out that the constant 
interaction of discontinuous and continuous phenomena leads to the impression that 
they are something other than themselves. Lotman calls this the “appropriation of 
misleading self-defi nitions” (from the neologism ‘самоназвание’, which literally means 
‘self-naming’) (Lotman 1992a: 26) and explicitly describes a two-tiered process whereby 
the self-naming occurs before the cultural metalanguage imposes its own name. Th us, 
the misappropriation occurs on at least two distinct levels, which creates additional 
diffi  culties in unravelling the source of cultural shift s.
What is most important about this distinction for Lotman is the intertwined 
reactivity of continuous and discrete dynamic forces, such that the strength of change 
in one area evokes an equally powerful change in another, distinct area. Th e more 
aggressive the realization of continuous processes, the stronger the reaction in the 
realization of discrete processes. In fact, for Lotman the “crossing over” between 
semiotic categories of diverse structural organization is the primary source of dynamic 
change in any system (Lotman 1992a: 26–27).
Lotman provides a fi ner grade of distinction to include actual discontinuity and the 
perception of discontinuity. Th e perception of discontinuity is manifested in the context 
of a culture’s power of self-description. Even though a culture’s development is cyclical 
in nature according to Lotman, the periods of self-awareness are “usually recorded as 
intermissions” (Lotman 1990: 144). Th e result is the production of a cultural text that 
is viewed as a “freeze frame, an artifi cially frozen moment between the past and the 
future” (Lotman 1992a: 27). Th e asymmetrical relationship between past and future 
is fragmented into a bifurcated past made of direct textual memory and correlative 
extratextual memory that come together like the point of a cone in the present and 
break apart again in the future into a spectrum of equally viable but widely variegated 
possibilities. It is at this juncture that we confront the question of textual memory, 
which requires both individual and collective memory systems, which are guaranteed 
outcomes within cultural space. 
If language itself necessarily exists within and beyond the individual speaker, 
and requires both individual and collective memory, then texts, as codifi cations of 
moments between past and future in an asymmetrical fashion, become meaningful in 
the undeterminedness of the future (Lotman 1992a: 27–28). And culture, in Lotman’s 
defi nition, necessarily includes not only collective memory, which allows for the 
preservation and transfer of knowledge and information through time, but collective 
intellect, which guarantees the potential actualization of coded information in the 
present and the production of new information in the future (Lotman 1992b: 200). 
Th us, it is through the communication act, defi ned as a semiotic entity, that continuity 
and higher-level ordered (rule-based) systems such as language and culture are created 
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from endless strings of discontinuities: “Th e individual human intellect does not have 
a monopoly in the work of thinking. Semiotic systems, both separately and together 
as the integrated unity of the semiosphere, both synchronically and in all the depths of 
historical memory, carry out intellectual operations, preserve, and work to increase the 
store of information. Th ought is within us, but we are within thought just as language 
is something engendered by our minds and directly dependent on the mechanisms of 
the brain, and we are with language” (Lotman 1990: 273).
Autocommunication
Lotman’s requirement of multiple languages as “the minimal meaning-generating unit” 
may be interpreted in a variety of ways and on a variety of levels (Lotman 1992a: 16). 
For instance, these diff erent languages could be the languages of the internal spaces 
of the semiosphere and the surrounding spaces in which the semiosphere is situated, 
or they could include Lotman’s fundamental distinction between I–I (also called 
autocommunication [автокоммуникация]) and I–s/he models of communication 
(Lotman 1990: 21–33; 2000: 163–177). Th e concept of autocommunication is one 
of Lotman’s  most powerful for defi ning mechanisms for the generation of meaning 
within semiotic (read cultural) space. Th e primary function of autocommunication 
is to create new information at both the cultural and individual levels. Th is new 
information displays an important series of characteristics, including (1) its qualitative 
reconstruction, (2) its not being self-contained or redundant, and (3) the doubling and 
redefi nition of both the message and the code (Lotman 1990: 21–22; 2000: 163–165). 
Autocommunication as one of the primary modes of communication is most oft en 
unarticulated and nonconscious within the community of users. In contrast, in I–s/he 
communication the message and the code are more stable, along with the amount 
of information conveyed, while the speakers/hearers are variable and in fl ux. Both 
modes of communication are present in all cultures, but the degree to which they are 
utilized varies not only from culture to culture, but also within internally bounded 
cultural spaces. 
One of the more salient features of autocommunication is that the sign types 
involved are more indexicalized (e.g., abbreviations can be deciphered only by the text 
creator, complete sentences are lacking) (Lotman 1990: 26–27). Lotman also claims 
that rhythmical-metrical systems originate in the autocommunication system and 
not in the I-s/he system (Lotman 1990: 30). Th us, cultural space is not merely “the 
sum of the messages circulated by various addressers,” but is also defi ned through 
autocommunication – “one message transmitted by the collective ‘I’ of humanity to 
itself ” (Lotman 1990: 33).
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What is most important is the obligatory doubling of parts of the speech act 
required by autocommunication. Using Jakobson’s speech act model, which is at 
the basis of Lotman’s model, we can say that all of the six factors of the speech act 
(addresser, addressee, code, contact, context, message) are doubled in any given single 
communication act.  For both Jakobson and Lotman, there is also never a single speech 
act, but they necessarily occur as plurals/multiplicities in a potentially infi nite series.
What is important to know about speech acts?
Th e Jakobsonian speech act model (1987[1957]: 66–71) is a critical baseline upon 
which Lotman constructs his model and serves as an ecologically-valid minimal unit of 
human language.  Th is dynamic model is a heuristic for understanding the minimum 
(not maximum) factors and functions present in any linguistic speech act:
             Six Factors:      Six Functions:
  Context     Referential
  Contact     Phatic
            Addresser       Addressee                Emotive      Conative
  Code     Metalingual
  Message     Poetic 
Figure 1. Jakobson’s speech act model. 
For Jakobson and Lotman, it is important to understand that all speech acts are multi-
faceted events embedded in the cultural context where the resulting meanings of acts are 
always negotiated (they are never given as a priori categories) (cf. “It’s cool” – meaning 
(1) the weather is chilly; (2) there is no problem, everything is fi ne; (3) something is 
interesting, neat, etc.). Th is model is compatible with imagining the neural image of a 
word as multisensory and obligatorily involves cross-modal eff ects (cf. Marslen-Wilson 
2007; Watkins et al. 2003; Massaro, Cohen 1995; McGurk, MacDonald 1976; Lieberman 
2006). By suggesting that word meanings are multisensory, I am implying an approach 
that is deeply informed by cognitive neuroscience, particularly the work of Mahon and 
Caramazza 2008, as well as certain synergies with the “embodied” approach given in 
Gallese and Lakoff  2005.  
Another result of modelling speech acts in this manner is highlighting the 
importance of who is talking and who is listening.  Speakers and hearers are always 
members of multiple and changing speech communities and communities of practice.  Th is 
means that we must imagine speech acts not only at an individual level of production 
and perception, but also at the group level.  All speech acts (and all language) are 
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ambiguous and redundant to varying degrees.  Finally, human language is not the 
product of a single brain but rather a product of multiple brains in sync with each other 
and embedded in the cultural context. 
Signifi cation and memory
   Individual our memories may be, but they are 
   structured, their very brain mechanisms aff ected, by
   the collective, social nature of the way we as 
   humans live. (Steven Rose 1992: 60)
Merlin Donald (2004: 43) identifi es the key to understanding human language as a 
collective phenomenon when he notes that: “[t]he isolated brain does not come up with 
external symbols. Human brains collectively invent symbols in a creative and dynamic 
process”. Symbols are invented, according to Donald (2004: 43), by means of executive 
skills “that created a nervous system that invented representation out of necessity”. It is 
the human ability to collectively invent innovative and dynamic external symbols that 
the fi eld of linguistics calls signifi cation. Without signifi cation as the initial and primary 
ability that underlies human language and all of human cognition, there can be no 
nonhereditary collective memory. Signifi cation always requires the translation from one 
system into another, and the process is potentially infi nite and unbounded (Jakobson 
1985: 206; CP 4.127). Th is fact will become especially relevant in understanding speech 
acts and the construction of linguistic meaning. 
Donald singles out autocueing, the uniquely human ability to voluntarily control 
memory recall, that provides freedom from the hic et nunc. It would have been a 
prerequisite to the development of human language, which requires volitional actions, 
including retrieval of linguistic forms and their modifi cation (Donald 2004: 45). 
Also, the many diff erent living systems are able to communicate with other living 
beings within and beyond their species and the environment, but signifi cation and 
autocueing are the critical pieces for human language. With these two primary abilities – 
signifi cation/invention of creative and dynamic external symbols and voluntary control 
of memory retrieval – the evolution of human language becomes possible. 
Tomasello’s (1999: 97) insights about linguistic reference as a “social action” is an 
important corollary to the phenomenon of signifi cation. At the point at which children 
begin participating in the signifi cation process as learners of linguistic symbols, they 
can tap into not only the richness of “preexisting” knowledge, but also participate in 
the uniqueness of linguistic symbols and their inherent polysemic nature, where one 
can cognitively embrace an event or object at multiple levels simultaneously (cf. “a rose, 
a fl ower, and a gift ”) (Tomasello 1999: 107).
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Lotman, Vygotsky, and cognitive models 
of signifi cation and communication
We have seen that Lotman presents a contextually based theory of cultural meaning 
that relies heavily on semiotic principles. In particular, Lotman’s modelling of 
communication requires multiple languages and multiple systems of communication 
acts, including I–s/he and I–I (autocommunication) systems. While the term 
autocommunication may be somewhat misleading, it is, in fact, autocommunication 
that plays a central role in the generation of new information at both the collective and 
individual levels. Texts, according to Lotman, may be interpreted (or misinterpreted) 
as predominantly code or message. When a text fails to convey new information, but 
converts existing meanings into a new system, that text is being used as code and this is 
the essence of autocommunication. Th us, central to the notion of autocommunication 
is the acknowledgment of the preexistence of cultural and linguistic structures that give 
rise to qualitative reconstructions, new forms, and new meanings. 
Clearly, Lotman’s autocommunication is not based on Vygotsky’s defi nitions of 
egocentric or internal speech. Furthermore, Lotman’s distinction is not embedded 
in a developmental model, which is an essential part of Vygotsky’s system. However, 
Lotman’s model extends the notion of the primacy of communication events in which 
language users are members of a collective consciousness not only at the inception 
of their development, but throughout the life cycle of the individual. Both Lotman 
and Vygotsky agree on the important generative power of language in moving and 
modulating meanings between the individual and collective levels, and both of them 
are interested in understanding how this happens. What they share is their focus on 
semiotic units and the importance of meaning (not merely information) and the 
construction of memory, which is an important part of higher thought. When language 
is viewed as a mediator between the code and the sociocultural context, and specifi c 
forms of language (such as egocentric, internal, social) can serve as a basis for what 
Vygotsky calls metaconsciousness (the development of higher thought), then we see 
more clearly how these two semiotic approaches are complementary to each other. 
For both Vygotsky and Lotman, metaconsciousness is embedded in the semiospheric 
context (or social milieu) and only subsequently is it taken up by the individual.  As 
Frawley (1997: 89) eloquently states: “Metaconsciousness is fi rst of all a property of 
the social group which is then appropriated by the individual, who can in turn relocate 
metaconsciousness in the group, depending on the task at hand. Higher thought is both 
double and fl uid, fl owing from the group to the individual and back again to the group”. 
What becomes meaningful for the individual, and thus worthy of memory encoding, 
is a product of both the semiosphere (cultural space) in which the individual exists 
and the individual’s goals at a particular point in time. As Daniel Schacter (1996: 
52) points out: “Encoding and remembering are virtually inseparable. But the close 
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relationship between the two can sometimes cause problems in our everyday lives. We 
remember only what we have encoded, and what we encode depends on who we are – 
our past experiences, knowledge, and needs all have a powerful infl uence on what we 
retain.” Also, the cultural values and languages that we speak clearly play a role in the 
construction of the cultural and individual self. 
Stephen Rose (1992: 321) argues for the necessity of morphological, biochemical 
and physiological dimensions as minimums to begin to understand memory. Rose 
(1992: 90) also identifi es salient features of memory, including that it is error-full and 
utilizes multiple modalities, and he therefore notes that his three dimensions may not 
be suffi  cient, but moves his experimental paradigm toward a diff erent goal: “[I]n an 
important sense the memory is not confi ned to a small set of neurons at all, but has 
to be understood as a property of the entire brain, even the entire organism. […] Th e 
point is that the sites of change are not equivalent to the sites of the property that they 
change” (Rose 1992: 322). 
What is clear is the need for a more robust theory of memory and language that 
can be not only relevant at the system level but also provide viable system-based 
explanations. Th e critical role that language plays in the encoding, maintenance, 
and retrieval of memory has yet to be fully articulated in cognitive science research. 
Inclusion of the works of Lotman and Vygotsky into this conversation is a positive 
step, a way to bridge the gap between idiosyncratic and system-based explanations. 
Extending Vygotskian categories
Vygotsky’s defi ning attributes of egocentric speech (illusion of comprehension, collective 
monologue, and vocalization) and his defi nition of the relationship of egocentric speech 
to internal speech, while originally conceived and experimentally validated in young 
children and child development, may also provide a key to understanding not only 
child development but also questions of language changes in aging. Specifi cally, in 
both normal aging and in some age-related memory pathologies, empirical data may 
be interpreted to demonstrate a reemergence of egocentric speech, where individuality 
is consumed in the loss of individual memory and consciousness, and the individual 
disappears again into the broader cultural context of collective monologues and illusions 
of comprehension. 
Th e notion that egocentric speech could reemerge in aging is consistent with 
Vygotsky’s characterization of the evolutionary path that egocentric speech takes in 
early development, as it becomes intertwined with internal speech. Such an application 
of Vygotsky’s framework beyond early child development provides additional theoretical 
premises for analysing language change throughout the life cycle. Application of 
Lotman’s communication model (I–s/he and I–I) and Vygotsky’s modelling of speech 
 The importance of Lotmanian semiotics to sign theory and the cognitive neurosciences  359
types and his work on the relationship between thinking and speech can provide a 
useful metalanguage for understanding and analysing language change and loss in 
aging. Future research in examining the interaction of language and aging, including 
empirically rich data obtained through appropriate experimental methods, will be 
required in order to demonstrate the ultimate utility of Vygotskian modelling of speech 
types.
Future directions in semiotics and the cognitive sciences
Th ere are currently several trends in the cognitive sciences that are working toward a 
theory of understanding the language for thought and memory. Frawley’s work puts 
forward a set of research that explores the relationship between private (egocentric) 
speech and the language for thought. His observation about the appropriate way to 
defi ne the relationship between private speech and thought also provides a realistic 
appraisal of how to understand the experimental data: “Private speech does not 
represent thought but is a symptom of it, and so, with respect to performance, refl ects 
both failure and success” (Frawley 1997: 185). 
One of the challenges in moving forward in cognitive research involving language 
and memory may be the redefi ning of basic concepts in the related fi elds. Donald has 
argued for recognition of “the immediate time frame within which most conscious 
human action takes place. . . . [and which] is a much larger window of experience 
than short-term memory” (2001: 47). Donald makes the point that many laboratory 
protocols have a short time frame by design and oft en do not take into account this 
more critical, longer time frame (Donald 2001: 47). 
Th e work that I and my colleagues undertook with H. M. (Skotko et al. 2005) is 
an example of how changing the time frame of analysis can produce results that both 
challenge and deepen our understanding of diff erent types of memory and lead to a fi ne-
tuning and strengthening of models of human memory (cf. Dew, Cabeza 2011).  When 
looking at H. M.’s usage of language from a more broadly based discourse perspective, 
it becomes clear (1) where H. M. demonstrated higher competency than his peer group 
(in type/token ratio) and (2) where he demonstrates defi cits (Skotko et al. 2005: 403). 
If we now implement Jakobson’s speech act model as discussed previously, we can 
characterize H. M.’s speech in terms of the six functions (metalingual, conative, poetic, 
emotive, referential, phatic) in the following manner: (1) H. M.’s metalingual function 
is highly developed and exceeds expectations for healthy subjects of his educational 
background and age group; (2) H. M.’s conative responses, whether they be verbal 
answers to questions or subsequent actions responding to requests, are robust; (3) H. 
M.’s use of the poetic function is developed, especially in punning and humorous turns of 
phrase, and merits special attention; (4) H. M.’s emotive function is appropriate in terms 
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of his aff ect, sense of humour, laughter, eye contact with interlocutors, body language, 
gestures accompanying speech, but his desire to share verbally is more reactive than 
initiatory; (5) H. M. makes limited reference to the extralinguistic context surrounding 
his discourse, but on occasion does make direct references to persons and things; 
thus, his referential function is operative; (6) Th e weakest area of discourse for H. M. 
in terms of the speech act model is his lack of use of the phatic function, including his 
reluctance to initiate or continue conversation, to reinitiate a previously given topic of 
conversation, or to interact with his interlocutor’s narrative if a question to him is not 
involved. (Note that there are exceptions to this characterization, but they are quite 
infrequent.)
Vygotsky’s framework for the interrelatedness of diff erent types of speech may 
also lead to interesting results in the context of analysing so-called critical periods 
[(also called periods of “susceptibility” or “sensitivity” (Dowling 2004: 51)] in language 
acquisition. Th e notion that there is a critical period for language acquisition is still 
popular in many linguistic circles and remains for many unanalysed and unchallenged. 
However, as we have seen, for the neuroscience community the notion of critical periods 
is much more complicated than the primitive rendition we oft en see through the prism 
of linguistics. Vygotskian theory may facilitate a rethinking of this notion within the 
fi eld of linguistics and lead to more realistic conceptualizations, thus bringing the fi elds 
of linguistics and neuroscience into closer relationship.
Both Lotman and Vygotsky have generated modelling systems that contribute to 
a theory of the generation, maintenance, and loss of meaning at all levels of human 
interaction. Th eir work is a constant reminder that what becomes meaningful for the 
individual, and thus potentially worthy of memory encoding, is a product of the col-
lective semiotic space in which human beings exist and develop throughout their lives. 
Improving imaging methods for examining language 
acquisition, maintenance and loss
In our unique longitudinal fMRI study of second language acquisition (Andrews et al. 
2013; Andrews 2014), we set out to collect a robust set of data acquired longitudinally 
using both fMRI and behavioural and profi ciency data on subjects who begin their 
intensive study of a second language (Russian) during the study. By coordinating 
profi ciency testing and fMRI scanning, we could analyse the degree to which fMRI 
can track language acquisition within subjects. From the behavioural and profi ciency 
data we could derive empirically valid information about the achievements of the 
subjects in a range of measurements that are available by task (listening comprehension, 
reading, grammar/lexicon) as a component of the analysis of the fMRI scan data for 
a listening comprehension task.  Regions of interest (ROIs) in our fMRI study were 
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selected based on the following principles: (1) regions that are frequently mentioned 
in the fMRI literature for sentence comprehension (Price 2010: 68) or CSM literature 
(Corina et al. 2010: 107–111) and (2) regions that showed signifi cant change across the 
language acquisition scans.  Th e regions (bilaterally given) are MTG (medial temporal 
gyrus), STG (superior temporal gyrus), MFG (middle frontal gyrus), IFG (inferior 
frontal gyrus), PoG (postcentral gyrus),  PrG (precentral gyrus).
Using a multivariate analysis of covariance allows us to determine if there is a 
signifi cant relationship between the changes in activations in the ROIs for each subject 
across the 3 scans/time points by comparing those activation changes to changes in 
profi ciency for each subject.  Th e result produced a p value = 0.01, which supports 
the fundamental research hypothesis that language acquisition is associated with 
characteristic activations found in the Russian conditions. Furthermore, the lack of 
signifi cance for the English-rest condition (where p = 0.47) strongly supports the belief 
that non-normal residuals are not distorting the analysis in any important way. Finally, 
time eff ect is signifi cant for the Russian conditions and shows activation levels changing 
across the three sets of longitudinal measurements.
Th e importance of understanding invariance in variation has been one of the central 
concerns of theoretical linguistics of the 20th and 21st centuries. Th e construction and 
conducting of imaging studies that include protocols of language that are not only 
ecologically valid and coupled with behavioural and profi ciency data, but also allow 
for multiple comparisons across and within subjects longitudinally, may provide a new 
perspective on how to answer some of the most challenging issues about brain and 
language, as well as formulate new questions that can deepen the research paradigms 
in cognitive and neurolinguistics. 
Moving forward in the study of brain(s) and language(s)
Th e key to understanding human language as a collective phenomenon is, as Donald 
(2004: 43) notes, that “[t]he isolated brain does not come up with external symbols. 
Human brains collectively invent symbols in a creative and dynamic process”, and 
symbols are invented by means of executive skills “that created a nervous system 
that invented representation out of necessity”. It is the human ability to collectively 
invent innovative and dynamic external symbols that the fi eld of linguistics calls 
signifi cation. Without signifi cation as the initial and primary ability that underlies 
human language and all of human cognition, there can be no nonhereditary collective 
memory. Signifi cation always requires the translation from one system into another, 
and the process is potentially infi nite and unbounded (Jakobson 1985: 206; CP 4.127). 
Signifi cation is a prerequisite for human language and nonhereditary collective memory; 
it is not a prerequisite for all forms of communication.
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If we extend Lotman’s and Donald’s point about writing and collective memory to 
contemporary language users, we are reminded that writing is symbiotic with reading, 
and that in fact reading is one of the important components of not only deepening 
lexical, grammatical and syntactic knowledge of language(s), but it is also a fundamental 
component in education and the learning of other types of knowledge ranging from the 
natural and physical sciences to the social sciences and humanities.  Once we become 
readers, the neurological interface of our languaging is fundamentally diff erent than 
it was when we were unable to read.  When the auditory and visual pathways learn 
to interact in reading, and this interaction becomes ubiquitous, then these diff erent 
modalities continue to interact even when we are not reading.  
As we begin to move our research perspective from a language to multiple languages 
and how they are acquired, maintained and lost throughout the life cycle, we are 
challenged to frame our work in methods that treat change as essential, not essentialist. 
Th is requires a more dynamic framework for analysis, and also requires the inclusion 
of a broader range of subjects and studies from the lesion-defi cit tradition as well as 
healthy subject research. Lotman’s oeuvre provides additional avenues for explicating 
how multimodality and variation are relevant to the interface of the functioning brain 
and human language.
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